On Tuesday, the internal security service of Israel assumed the responsibility of not having taken into account the warning signs of a planned attack by Hamas before the devastating strike of activists on October 7, 2023. But the agency also criticized the Israeli government for the policies which allowed Hamas to raise the weapons quietly, to collect funds and to gain support, among other failures.
The conclusions of the Shin Bet, as the security agency is known, was published a few days after a similar investigation by the Israeli army revealed that the senior officers had largely underestimated Hamas and misinterpreted the first warnings that a major attack arrived.
The report published on Tuesday consisted only of a downgraded summary, leaving an unknown quantity of non -disclosed material. But even the summary clearly explained the gaps of the agency.
Plans for a Hamas raid in southern Israel reached the offices of intelligence agents in 2018 and again in 2022, said the summary, but the agency did not deal with warnings as a significant threat. Consequently, the agency said, she did not include it in scenarios exploring future confrontations with the militant group.
While the Bet Shin said that he had taken Hamas seriously, he recognized that he had not responded in an appropriate manner to the first indications of attack plans, or to the subsequent signs of imminent blood effusion.
The Israeli authorities said they published the results, even if they kept parts of the classified report, in the light of the gravity of the attack. About 1,200 people were killed that day and around 250 people took the hostage, triggering war in the Gaza Strip.
The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resisted an independent examination of events leading to the deadliest day in the history of Israel. Rather, it has enabled each of the country’s security institutions to inquire itself, despite public requests from a commission of inquiry.
In a debate in the Israeli Parliament on Monday, Netanyahu said that he had supported the creation of a commission to investigate Hamas’ attack, but suggested that such an investigation generate biased results aimed at targeting it politically.
“I am not dissuaded by manufactured investigations and a politician hunting,” he said. “I will continue to insist on the truth. I will continue to demand a balanced commission of inquiry that will reach the truth. »»
The resistance of Mr. Netanyahu to an investigation and calls for his resignation contrasts with the actions of certain other Israeli officials.
The former military chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Herzi Halevi, resigned this month after taking responsibility for what he called his “terrible failure” to prevent the attack. The chief of Tibia, Ronen Bar, said to Israeli media On Tuesday, he did not intend to resign until all the hostages taken in Israel were repatriated, but he recognized that the attack could have been prevented.
In his report, the Shin Bet also said that he had failed to coordinate enough with the army and establish a chain of responsibility Claire. “This is not the norm that we expected from ourselves and the public from us,” said the agency.
At the same time, the Shin Bet report, unlike the recent soldier, directly underlined government policies as a contributing factors for the attack. He said the government authorized Hamas to accumulate weapons and collect funds for its military wing through Qatar. And he underlined the government’s reluctance to undertake “offensive” initiatives, in particular by targeting Hamas leaders in Gaza.
The agency also cited the treatment of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli detention and “the perception that Israeli society has weakened”. Before the attack, Mr. Netanyahu advanced a plan to revise Israel’s judiciary, triggering demonstrations nationwide, and many Israelis blamed Netanyahu for the attack on Hamas, citing domestic disorders such as a factor that encourages activists.
The Shin Bet report echoes the conclusions of a New York Times article published weeks after the attack, based on interviews with Israeli, Arab, European and American officials, as well as an examination of documents and evidence of the Israeli government.
The office of Mr. Netanyahu refused a request for comments on the conclusions of the Shin Bet. Israeli information media reported that the office had published a unofficial declaration to a small group of local journalists who was “attributed to the inner circle of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “This press release said the intelligence agency had presented” an “investigation” that does not answer questions “and did not correspond to” the magnitude of the organization’s enormous failure “.
The Prime Minister’s office presented a series of failures by intelligence agents, including an assessment presented only a few days before the attack “definitively indicating” that Hamas wanted to avoid a campaign against Israel. He accused Mr. Bar of being failed.
“The chief of the shin did not deem good to wake up the Prime Minister on the evening of the attack-the most fundamental and obvious decision that one could imagine,” he said.
Johnatan Reiss Contributed reports.
