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Your guide on what Trump’s second term for Washington, Business and the World means
Going to war is always a bet. Iran, Israel and now the United States has all rolled the dice.
In the short term, it seems that the bet of Israel has succeeded. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu has managed to kill a large part of Iran’s military leaders and to impose serious damage to the country’s nuclear and military infrastructure. Israel has also succeeded in its clear goal of attracting the United States to the fight.
Donald Trump’s decision to join the conflict was, in part, a reaction to the first Israeli successes. The American president is still eager to look like a winner and, the day after Iran’s American bombing, claimed a “spectacular military success”.
On the other hand, the bet of the Iranian government that he could lead an “axis of resistance” to Israel – while avoiding the open confrontation – failed badly. For decades, Iran has skillfully advanced its interests in the region, sponsoring proxys such as hizbollah, Hamas and Houthis, while working on its own nuclear program.
For many years, the Iranian strategy seemed both subtle and effective. In the Gulf States, he generally complained that four Arab capitals – Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus and Sanaa (in Yemen) – were controlled by pro -Iranian forces. Iran had also got closer to the ability to develop a nuclear weapon.
But this long -term strategy is now in tatters. The Assad regime fell in Syria and Hizbollah and Hamas was seriously damaged by Israel. Now the Iranian regime itself is under direct attack.
The medium and long -term consequences of this war are much less clear. Israel will have trouble converting short -term tactical successes – regardless of the spectacular – long -term security. The United States has a long and bitter experience of seeing the initial military victories turn into endless and endless wars. Iranian theocracy is subject to an unprecedented attack. But bombing campaigns rarely lead to a change of diet. The regime could therefore hang on and live to fight another day.
The supreme leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and what remains of his soldiers now faces a menu of deeply unappetizing choice. Emotionally, they will want to retaliate. But Trump promised that Iranian reprisals will lead to more intense American attacks.
In the interest of his own survival, leadership in Tehran could opt for minimum reprisals and then reach the diplomatic option. But the Iranians will also fear that, as American neoconservatives like to say, “weakness is provocative”. A failure to respond could invite other attacks from Israel, as well as by encouraging Iran’s interior enemies.
Tehran will also know that Trump has made the decision to bomb in the context of judicial depths of his own supporters – who fear that the United States will enter another “war forever”. If Iran strikes American targets in the Middle East – or forces the price of oil by closing the Hormuz Strait – then these doubts and the divisions in America will increase. Trump’s first reaction would be to fight back. But it is volatile and can be reversed in an instant, especially when it is under internal political pressure.
The United States is also known to withdraw from the tangles of the Middle East in the face of heavy losses. The 1983 bombing of the American marine barracks in Beirut, widely blamed in Hezbollah, has cost the life of 241 Americans – and led to an American decision to withdraw from Lebanon, rather than degenerate.
Memories such as it highlight the risks that Trump takes. The only final result that would allow the United States to crediblely claiming the “mission accomplished” would be if Iran has completely and verified its nuclear program, and if the current Iranian regime was somehow replaced by a stable and pro-Western government, without desire for an additional conflict with the United States or Israel.
These results seem very improbable. The most likely alternatives are a seriously injured but still hostile Iran – which could ride unpredictably. A second possibility would be the collapse of the current regime, followed by a civil conflict – which could attract foreigners or allow terrorists to establish shelters. One or the other of these results would risk shooting the United States in another war in the Middle East, including the commitment of the troops on the ground.
The uncertainty about Iran’s options and the American stay of stay underlines the fragile nature of the current successes of Israel. The government of Netanyahu is currently at war against several fronts – in Gaza and Iran and, to a lesser extent, in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and in occupied West Bank. He has no clear vision of ending these conflicts.
Israel has greatly contributed to establishing itself as the superpower of the Middle East. He has nuclear weapons (not declared) and the support of the United States. But, in the long term, it is untenable for a country of 10 million people to dominate a region with a population of several hundred million.
Israel also takes great risks with its relationship with the United States. His brutal war in Gaza seriously damaged his reputation with the Democrats. If the government of Netanyahu is now blamed for having led the United States to another war forever, the American backlash against Israel could become bipartite and sustainable.
In their various ways, Iran, Israel and the United States have all played war. The risk is that they will all end up as losers.
gideon.rachman@ft.com
