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Your guide on what the US elections of 2024 mean for Washington and Le Monde
Donald Trump will never win the Nobel Peace Prize. But it should be a strong competitor for the Charlemagne price – which is awarded each year to the person who has made the greatest contribution to European unity.
The American president has courted Russia, has undermined the Faith in the NATO alliance, threatened the EU of prices and stimulated the extreme right in Europe. All of this had a galvanizing effect on the EU. Fundamental steps towards greater European unity – in a standstill for decades – are now underway.
There are three key areas to watch. The first is European defense; The second is a joint European debt; The third repairs the breach between the United Kingdom and the EU.
Dramatic oscillations in European public opinion underlie these developments. A survey Last week showed that 78% of British consider Trump as a threat to the United Kingdom. Some 74% of Germans and 69% of French people agree. In another surveyFrance was considered a “reliable partner” of 85% of Germans and Great Britain marked 78%-the United States is down 16%.
Many European leaders agree that Trump America is now a threat, although little will say it aloud for diplomatic reasons. They are also uncomfortably aware of how the Transatlantic Alliance, now in its eighth decade, made them very dependent on American military support. It’s not just a matter of money. Really dangerous dependencies concern American technology and weapons.
Europeans can see how much Ukrainians are problems after the Trump administration’s decision to cut the flows of intelligence and weapons. They therefore pursue a policy of two tracks. They must delay the dismissal of American military support to Europe as long as possible, while preparing at that time as quickly as possible.
It was the logic behind last week’s decision to allow the European Commission to raise 150 billion euros to spend on the EU defense industry. New expenses are likely to focus on the areas where European countries are particularly dependent on America, such as air defense.
The emission of the common European debt is not only a means of raising funds for defense. It also offers the possibility of building the euro as an alternative to the dollar as a global reserve currency. The Capricitus of the Trump administration means that there is a considerable global appetite for an alternative to American treasury bills as a safe asset.
The taboo against the common European debt is traditionally strong in frugal Germany. He was partially broken during the pandemic. Now he is likely to be carried away. Friedrich Merz, who will be the next Chancellor of Germany, is also evolving to exempt national expenses for the defense and the infrastructure of the constitutional limits of his country with deficit expenses. Its previous budgetary prudence means that Germany has much more space to borrow than France or Great Britain strongly in debt.
A form of military Keynesianism could restore the greatest economy in Europe. As a leading French businessman said, with more than a touch of ambivalence: “It’s very clear. The Germans cannot sell their cars. So they will make tanks.
Trump’s last favor at Europe is to hasten the post-Brexit rapprochement between the EU and the United Kingdom. Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, the British and French leaders, worked closely in Ukraine. They could form a powerful triumvirate with Merz.
A mechanism for the increase in military spending would be a new European defense fund, in which Great Britain could participate. This would have the additional virtue of giving the United Kingdom and the EU a new form of cooperation which avoids the reopening of the Pandora’s Brexit box.
The prospect of repairing some of the damage caused by Brexit underlines that it is not only a threat to Europe. It is also a moment of opportunity. Europe can now provide plausibly a more stable commercial environment than Trump America – which can already be reflected in the relative performance of stock markets in the United States and Europe.
While the Trump administration increases its assault against American universities, it is also possible to attract leading researchers in Europe. The gap in wages and research funds between North America and Europe is important. But the overall sums of money involved are low, compared to the amounts that are launched for defense.
There will be a lot of disagreements and reverse on the way to a greater European unit. France and Germany already come up against the way in which the new EU defense fund will spend its money.
Each confrontation like this will nourish the skepticism of those who say that Europe will never bring its act together. There were doubts and similar reversals on the often jack of road to set up the European community of coal and steel origin in the 1950s and the single currency in the 1990s. But European leaders arrived at the end because the political imperative to agree was so overwhelming.
All the big steps forward for European unity were caused by geopolitical shocks – first the end of the Second World War; Then the end of the Cold War. Now, graceful of Trump, we examine the end of the transatlantic alliance. Europe has responded with strength and inventiveness to the last two major challenges. He can do it again.
gideon.rachman@ft.com
